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a b s t r a c t
We study graphical games where the payoff function of each player satisfies one of four
types of symmetry in the actions of his neighbors. We establish that deciding the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard in general for all four types. Using a characterization
of games with pure equilibria in terms of even cycles in the neighborhood graph, as well
as a connection to a generalized satisfiability problem, we identify tractable subclasses
of the games satisfying the most restrictive type of symmetry. Hardness for a different
subclass leads us to identify a satisfiability problem that remainsNP-hard in the presence of
a matching, a result that may be of independent interest. Finally, games with symmetries
of two of the four types are shown to possess a symmetric mixed equilibrium which can
be computed in polynomial time. We thus obtain a natural class of games where the
pure equilibrium problem is computationally harder than the mixed equilibrium problem,
unless P = NP.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The idea underlying graphical games [1] is that in games with a large number of players, the payoff of any particular
player will often depend only on the actions of a small number of other players in a local neighborhood. More formally,
a graphical game is given by a (directed or undirected) graph on the set of players of a normal-form game, such that the
payoff of each player depends only on the actions of his neighbors in this graph. If neighborhoods are bounded, graphical
games can be represented using space polynomial in the number of players. Symmetric games constitute another natural and
well-studied class of games, characterized by the fact that players cannot, or need not, distinguish between other players.
In this paper, we consider graphical games where the payoff function of each player is symmetric in the actions of his
neighbors. For instance, consider a setting where each player is faced with the decision of producing one of two types of
complementary goods within a regional neighborhood. Players are not only producers but also consumers and thus happier
when both products are available within their neighborhood. We will see in Section 3.3 that deciding the existence of a
pure Nash equilibrium, i.e., a profile of mutual best responses, in such a setting is highly nontrivial yet computationally
tractable.
Related work. The computational problem of finding Nash equilibria in graphical games with degree bounded by 3 has
recently been shown equivalent to the same problem for general n-player games with n ≥ 4 [2], and thus complete for
the complexity class PPAD [3]. It is not surprising that the structure of the neighborhood graph greatly influences the
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complexity of the equilibrium problem. PPAD-hardness holds even if the underlying graph has constant pathwidth, but
becomes tractable for graphs of degree 2, i.e., for paths [4]. All known algorithms for the more general case of trees have
exponential worst-case running time even on trees with bounded degree and pathwidth 2, but equilibria satisfying various
fairness criteria can be computed in polynomial time if additionally there are only two actions per player and the best
response policy, a data structure representing all Nash equilibria of a game, has polynomial size [5].
A different line of research has investigated the problem of deciding the existence of pure Nash equilibria, i.e., equilibria
where the support of each strategy contains only a single action. Unlike Nash equilibria inmixed strategies, i.e., probabilistic
combinations of actions, pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist. If they exist, however, pure equilibria have two distinct
advantages over mixed ones. For one, requiring randomization in order to reach a stable outcome has been criticized on
various grounds. Inmulti-player games, where action probabilities in equilibrium can be irrational numbers, randomization
is particularly questionable. Secondly, pure equilibria as computational objects are usually much smaller in size than mixed
ones. The pure equilibrium problem is NP-complete for graphical games on directed graphs with outdegree bounded by 2
and with only two actions for each player and two different payoffs, and tractable for graphs with bounded treewidth [6,7].
Brandt et al. [8] analyze four classes of symmetric games, and show that the pure equilibrium problem is tractable if the
number of actions is a constant, and complete for NP or PLS, respectively, if the number of actions grows in the number
of players. One of the classes, in which all players have identical payoff functions, is guaranteed to possess a symmetric
equilibrium, i.e., one where all players play the same strategy. This equilibrium is not necessarily pure, but can be found
efficiently if the number of actions is not too large compared to the number of players [9]. A larger class, allowing different
payoff functions for different players, admits an approximation by a factor depending on the Lipschitz constant of the payoff
function and on the square of the number of actions, and a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the case of two
actions [10].
These results fuel hope that tractability results can be obtained for larger classes of games satisfying some kind of
symmetry. In this regard, Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [11] consider games on a d-dimensional undirected torus or grid
with payoff functions that are identical for all players and symmetric in the actions of the players in the neighborhood, a
condition that will be called symmetry in this paper. In particular, they show that deciding the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium in such a game is NL-complete when d = 1 and NEXP-complete for d ≥ 2. In this paper, we investigate the
pure equilibrium problem in graphical games satisfying the kinds of symmetries considered by Brandt et al. [8]. Our work
can thus be seen as a refinement of the work of Gottlob et al. [6] and of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [11].
Paper structure and results. We begin by introducing the necessary game-theoretic concepts. In Section 3, we then
investigate the computational complexity of the pure equilibrium problem in graphical games satisfying four different types
of symmetries. The question of tractable classes of graphical games is answered mostly in the negative. For three of the four
symmetry classes, deciding the existence of a pure equilibrium is NP-hard already for the case of two actions, two payoffs,
and neighborhoods of size two. Assuming the most restricted type of symmetry, the problem becomes NP-hard when there
are three different payoffs, or neighborhoods of size four. On the other hand, we use interesting connections of the latter
class to even cycles in directed graphs and to generalized satisfiability to identify tractable classes of games. As a corollary,
we exhibit a satisfiability problem that remains NP-hard in the presence of a matching. We present this result, which may
be of independent interest, in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we show that mixed equilibria in games with two of the above
symmetry types can be found in polynomial time if the number of actions grows only slowly in the neighborhood size. Quite
interestingly, there exists a class of games where deciding the existence of a pure equilibrium problem is likely to be harder
than finding a mixed equilibrium. We assume the reader to be familiar with the complexity classes P, NP, and #P, and the
notion of polynomial-time reducibility (see, e.g., [12]).
2. Preliminaries
An accepted way to model situations of strategic interaction is by means of a normal-form game (see e.g., [13]).
Definition 1 (Normal-Form Game). A game in normal-form is a tuple Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N) where N is a set of players
and for each player i ∈ N , Ai is a nonempty set of actions available to i, and pi : (∏i∈N Ai)→ R is a function mapping each
action profile of the game, i.e., combination of actions, to a real-valued payoff for i.
A vector s ∈ ∏i∈N Ai of actions is also called a profile of pure strategies. This concept can be generalized to (mixed) strategy
profiles s ∈ S = ∏i∈N Si, by letting players randomize over their actions. Here, we have Si denote the set of probability
distributions over player i’s actions, or (mixed) strategies available to player i. We further write n = |N| for the number of
players in a game, si for the ith strategy in profile s, and sC for the vector of strategies for all players in a subset C ⊆ N .
A graphical game is given by a graph on the set of players, such that the payoff of a player only depends only on his
own action, and on the actions of his neighbors in the graph. In the following definition, the underlying graph is directed,
corresponding to a neighborhood relation that is not necessarily symmetric.
Definition 2 (Graphical Game). Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N) be a normal-form game, ν : N → 2N . Γ is a graphical game
with neighborhood ν if for all i ∈ N and s, s′ ∈ AN , pi(s) = pi(s′)whenever sνˆ(i) = s′νˆ(i), where νˆ(i) = ν(i) ∪ {i}.
A game Γ has k-bounded neighborhoods if there exists ν : N → 2N such that Γ is a graphical game with neighborhood ν
and for all i ∈ N , |ν(i)| ≤ k.
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We assume throughout the paper that graphical games are encoded by listing the payoffs of each player as a function of the
actions of his neighbors.
Symmetry as a property of a mathematical object refers to its invariance under a certain type of transformation.
Symmetries of games usually mean invariance of the payoffs under automorphisms of the set of action profiles induced
by some group of permutations of the set of players. Anonymous games as considered by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [10],
for example, require the set of available actions to be the same for all players, and the payoff of a particular player to remain
the same under any permutation of the elements of an action profile. This imposes constraints on individual payoff functions
only and can therefore directly be applied to graphical games aswell. In general, however, it does notmakemuch sense from
a computational point of view to consider symmetries of the payoff functions without requiring the neighborhood graph to
be ‘‘symmetric’’ in an appropriateway aswell. Consider, for example, the class of all graphical gameswhose payoff functions
are invariant under automorphisms in the automorphism group of the neighborhood graph.While this class of games is very
natural, it does not impose meaningful computational restrictions. Indeed, it is not too hard to see that any graphical game
can be encoded by a game in the above class that has a neighborhood graph with a trivial automorphism group. Hardness
results for both pure and mixed equilibria thus carry over immediately.
In general, different types of restrictions on the neighborhood structurewill be required for different kinds of symmetries
of the payoff functions. In this paper, we take a slightly different approach. We consider properties found in anonymous
and symmetric games, and study graphical games that possess these properties. A characteristic feature of symmetries in
games is the inability to distinguish between other players. Following Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [10], the most general
class of games with this property will be called anonymous. Four different classes of games are obtained by considering
two additional characteristics: identical payoff functions for all players2 and the ability to distinguish oneself from the other
players. The games obtained by adding the former property will be called symmetric, and the presence of the latter will be
indicated by the prefix ‘‘self.’’ For the obvious reason, we will henceforth talk about games where the set of actions is the
same for all players and write A = A1 = · · · = An and k = |A|, respectively, to denote this set and its cardinality.
An intuitive way to describe anonymous games is in terms of equivalence classes of the aforementioned automorphism
group, using a notion introduced by Parikh [14] in the context of context-free languages. Given a set A of actions, the
commutative image of an action profile s ∈ AN is given by #(s) = (#(a, s))a∈A where #(a, s) = |{ i ∈ N : si = a }|.
In other words, #(a, s) denotes the number of players playing action a in action profile s, and #(s) is the vector of these
numbers for all the different actions. This definition naturally extends to action profiles for subsets of players.
Definition 3 (Symmetries). Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N) be a graphical game with neighborhood ν, A a set of actions such
that for all i ∈ N , Ai = A. Γ is called
• anonymous if for all i ∈ N and all s, s′ ∈ AN , pi(s) = pi(s′)whenever si = s′i and for all a ∈ A, #(a, sν(i)) = #(a, s′ν(i));
• symmetric if for all i, j ∈ N and all s, s′ ∈ AN , |ν(i)| = |ν(j)| and pi(s) = pj(s′) whenever si = s′j and for all a ∈ A,
#(a, sν(i)) = #(a, s′ν(j));
• self-anonymous if for all i ∈ N and all s, s′ ∈ AN , pi(s) = pi(s′)whenever for all a ∈ A, #(a, sνˆ(i)) = #(a, s′νˆ(i)); and
• self-symmetric if for all i, j ∈ N and all s, s′ ∈ AN , |ν(i)| = |ν(j)| and pi(s) = pj(s′) whenever for all a ∈ A,
#(a, sνˆ(i)) = #(a, s′νˆ(j)).
In other words, a (graphical) game is anonymous if the payoff of each player depends only on his own action and the number
of his neighbors playing each of the actions. In a self-anonymous game the payoff of each player depends only on the
‘‘observed’’ number of players for each action, where a player observes his own action and those of his neighbors. A player
in the latter class of games thus essentially does not differentiate his neighbors from himself. A game is symmetric if it is
anonymous and if the neighborhood size and payoff function are identical for all players. Similarly, a game is self-symmetric
if it is self-anonymous and if neighborhood size and payoff function are identical for all players.
It should be noted that a graphical game in one of the four classes does not necessarily belong to the corresponding
class of general normal-form games as defined by Brandt et al. [8], unless the neighborhood of every player contains all
other players. When talking about self-anonymous and self-symmetric games with two actions, we write pi(m) = pi(s)
where #(1, sνˆ(i)) = m for the payoff of player i when m players in his neighborhood, including i himself, play action 1, and
pi = (pi(m))0≤m≤|νˆ(i)| for the vector of payoffs for the possible values ofm.
One of the best-known solution concepts for strategic games is Nash equilibrium [15]. In Nash equilibrium, no player is
able to increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Definition 4 (Nash Equilibrium). Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N) be a normal-form game. A strategy profile s ∈ S of Γ is called
Nash equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N and each strategy s′i ∈ Si, pi(s) ≥ pi((sN\{i}, s′i)). A Nash equilibrium is called pure if
it is a pure strategy profile.
2 We assume the set of actions and the payoff function to be the same for all players rather than just those with intersecting neighborhoods. This is only
done for ease of exposition.
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Fig. 1. NAND payoffs pi(s) for the symmetric and the self-symmetric case. Columns correspond to the different values of the commutative image of swith
respect to ν(i) and νˆ(i). In the symmetric case, rows correspond to the different actions of player i.
3. Complexity of the pure equilibrium problem
For graphical games with neighborhoods of size one, the pure equilibrium problem can be decided in polynomial time
even without further restrictions on the payoff functions (see, e.g., [7]). On the other hand, the game used by Schoenebeck
and Vadhan [16] to showNP-completeness of the pure equilibrium problem in general graphical gameswith neighborhoods
of size two is anonymous. We thus have the following initial result.
Theorem 1 (Schoenebeck and Vadhan [16]). Deciding whether a graphical game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete,
even if every player has only two neighbors, two actions, and two different payoffs, and when restricted to anonymous games.
3.1. Symmetry and self-symmetry
We now turn to more restrictive kinds of symmetry. The following theorem concerns games where the utility functions
of all players are identical. The proof of this theorem is similar to a construction used by Schoenebeck and Vadhan [16]where
each gate of a Boolean circuit corresponds to a player in a graphical game, and two additional players play a game with or
without a pure equilibrium, depending on the output of the circuit. The main difficulty is to model these two steps using
only a single payoff function.
Theorem 2. Deciding whether a graphical game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, even if every player has only two
neighbors, two actions, and when restricted to symmetric games with two different payoffs or to self-symmetric games with three
different payoffs.
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. We can simply guess an action profile and verify that the action of each player is a best
response to the actions of the players in his neighborhood.
For hardness, we provide a reduction from the NP-complete problem circuit satisfiability [CSAT, see, e.g., 12]. All hardness
proofs in this paper are based on games that simulate Boolean circuits, in the sense that players of the game are associated
with gates of the circuit, and the actions played by some of them in any pure equilibrium mirror the outputs of the
corresponding gates given a satisfying assignment of the circuit. Each of these games is constructed inductively from smaller
games simulating different Boolean operators. While it is not always easy to distinguish between players corresponding to
inputs and outputs of a gate, and ‘‘auxiliary’’ players corresponding to neither of the two, we nevertheless try to label players
consistently: we mostly use letters from the beginning of the alphabet for players corresponding to inputs and for auxiliary
players, and letters from the end of the alphabet for players corresponding to outputs.
For a set N of players with appropriately defined neighborhoods ν, let Γ (N) = (N, {0, 1}N , (pi)i∈N) be a graphical game
with payoffs satisfying symmetry or self-symmetry as given in Fig. 1.3 We observe the following properties:
1. Let N be a set of players with |N| = 3. For each i ∈ N , let νˆ(i) = N . Then, an action profile s of Γ (N) is a pure equilibrium
if and only if #(1, s) = 2. In particular, for every i ∈ N , there exists a pure equilibrium where player i plays action 0 and
a pure equilibrium where he plays action 1.
2. Let N and N ′ be two disjoint sets of players with neighborhoods such that for all i ∈ N , ν(i) ⊆ N , and for all i ∈ N ′,
ν(i) ⊆ N ′. Then, s is a pure equilibrium of Γ (N ∪ N ′) if and only if sN and sN ′ are pure equilibria of Γ (N) and Γ (N ′),
respectively.
3. Let N be a set of players such that Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium and consider two players a, b ∈ N . Further consider
an additional player x /∈ N with ν(x) = {a, b}. Then the game Γ (N ∪ {x}) has a pure equilibrium, and in every pure
equilibrium s of Γ (N ∪ {x}), sx = 0 if sa = sb = 1 and sx = 1 otherwise. In other words, such a strategy profile always
satisfies sx = sa NAND sb.
4. Let N be a set of players and consider a particular player x ∈ N . Further consider five additional players a, b, c, d, e /∈ N
with neighborhoods according to Fig. 2, and denote N ′ = N ∪ {a, b, c, d, e}. Then, Γ (N ′) has a pure equilibrium if and
only if Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium s where sx = 0. For the direction from right to left, assume that Γ (N) has a pure
equilibrium s where sx = 0 and extend it to an action profile for Γ (N ′) by letting sa = 0 and sb = sc = sd = se = 1.
It is easily verified that s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (N ′). For the direction from left to right, consider an action profile s
for Γ (N ′) where sx = 1. If sa = 0, then action 1 is the unique best response for players c and d, after which action 0
is the unique best response for players b and e. In this case, player a can change his action to 1 to get a higher payoff. If
sa = 1, then the unique best response for players c and d is 0, and the unique best response for players b and e is 1. Again,
player a can change his action to get a higher payoff.
3 It was shown by Brandt et al. [8] that every anonymous or symmetric game with two actions per player can respectively be transformed into a self-
anonymous or self-symmetric game, while preserving pure equilibria.
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Fig. 2. Output gadget. All players have payoffs as in Fig. 1. Player xmust play action 0 in every pure equilibrium of the game.
5. Let N1 = {b, c, d} be an instance of N in Property 1, and N2 an instance of N ′ in Property 4 with N = {b}. Let N be any set
of players such that Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium, let a ∈ N , and denote N ′ = N1∪N2∪N . Further consider an additional
player x /∈ N ′ with ν(x) = {a, c}. Then,Γ (N ′∪{x}) has a pure equilibrium, and in every pure equilibrium s ofΓ (N ′∪{x}),
sx = 1 − sa. To see this, observe that by Property 1 exactly two players in N1 must play action 1, which, by Property 4,
have to be players c and d. By Property 3, and since ϕ NAND true = ¬ϕ, the claim follows.
Now consider an instance C of CSAT, and assume without loss of generality that C consists exclusively of NAND gates
and that no variable appearsmore than once as the input to the same gate. The latter assumption can bemade by Property 5.
We construct a game Γ = Γ (N) as follows. For every input of C we augment N by three players according to Property 1.
We then inductively define Γ by adding, for a gate with inputs corresponding to players a, b ∈ N , a player x as described in
Property 3. Finally, we construct a player according to Property 5 who plays the opposite action as the one corresponding
to the output of C, and identify this player with x in a new instance of Property 4. It is now easily verified that a pure
equilibrium of Γ corresponds to a computation of C which outputs true, and that such an equilibrium exists if and only if C
has a satisfying assignment. 
3.2. Self-anonymity and two different payoffs
Since self-symmetric games form a subset of self-anonymous games, Theorem 2 also implies NP-hardness of the self-
anonymous case. However, the result is not tight in that three different payoffs are required for hardness. A natural question
is what happens for self-anonymous games with only two different payoffs. In this section we will prove a tight result for
the most restricted version of self-anonymity, i.e., the case with only two different payoff functions.
The problem with anonymity and the construction used in the proof of Theorem 2 is that two different payoffs are not
enough to make a player care about his own action nomatter which actions are played by his neighbors. With four different
values for #(1, sνˆ(i)), there will either be an equilibriumwhere all players play the same action, or a situation where a player
is indifferent between both of his actions. When we want to use games to compute a function, such indifference is clearly
undesirable. The key idea that will enable us to prove the following theorem is to isolate pure equilibria that are themselves
symmetric in the actions of a subset of the players, i.e., equilibria in which these players all play the same action. To enforce
that two particular players play the same action in every equilibrium, we will add two additional players, each of which
observes the other as well as one of the original players. Depending on the actions of the original players, the new players
will either play a game with a unique pure equilibrium, or a game that is prototypical both for self-anonymous games and
for games without pure equilibria, namely Matching Pennies.
Theorem 3. Deciding whether a graphical game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, even if every player has only
two neighbors, two actions, and two different payoffs, and when restricted to self-anonymous games with two different payoff
functions.
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious.
For hardness, we again provide a reduction from CSAT. Let Γ (N) = (N, {0, 1}N , (pi)i∈N) denote a graphical game for a
setN of playerswith neighborhood ν andpayoff functions pi satisfying self-anonymity.Weobserve the following properties:
1. LetN be a set of players, a, b ∈ N , and consider two additional players x, y /∈ N with neighborhoods and payoffs according
to Fig. 3. Then, Γ (N ∪ {x, y}) has a pure equilibrium if and only if Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium s where sa = sb. For the
direction from right to left, assume that Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium swhere sa = sb and extend this to an action profile
for Γ (N ′) by letting sx = sa and sy = 1. It is easily verified that under this action profile players x and y both receive the
maximumpayoff of 1, such that the equilibrium condition is trivially satisfied. For the direction from left to right, assume
that one of the players x and y observes action 0 being played by player a or b, while the other one observes action 1. Then
players x and y effectively play thewell-knownMatching Pennies game.More precisely, the player observing 0 receives a
payoff of 1 if and only if #(s{x,y}) is odd, while the same is true for the player observing 1 if and only if this number is even.
Since both players can change between the two outcomes by changing their own action, there is no pure equilibrium.
2. Let N be a set of players with |N| = 3. For each i ∈ N , let νˆ(i) = N and let pi be defined according to Fig. 3. Then, any
action profile s satisfying #(1, s) = 1 or #(1, s) = 3 is a pure equilibrium of Γ (N). In particular, for each i ∈ N , there
exist equilibria s and s′ with sa = 0 and s′a = 1.
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Fig. 3. Equality gadget. A pure equilibrium exists if and only if players a and b play the same action.
Fig. 4. NAND gadget. The construction of Fig. 3 is used to ensure that players connected by ‘‘=’’ play the same action in every pure equilibrium.
3. Let N and N ′ be two disjoint sets of players with neighborhoods such that for all i ∈ N , ν(i) ⊆ N , and for all i ∈ N ′,
ν(i) ⊆ N ′. Again, s is a pure equilibrium of Γ (N ∪ N ′) if and only if sN and sN ′ are pure equilibria of Γ (N) and Γ (N ′),
respectively.
4. LetN = {a, b, c}with neighborhoods and payoffs as in Property 2, and assumeby Property 1 that every pure equilibrium s
of Γ (N) is symmetric, i.e., satisfies sa = sb = sc . Then, s with sa = sb = sc = 1 is the unique pure equilibrium of Γ (N).
Clearly, s is an equilibrium ofΓ (N), since all players receive themaximumpayoff of 1. In the only other symmetric action
profile, all players play action 0 and receive a payoff of 0. Either one of them can change his action to 1 to receive a higher
payoff.
5. LetN be a set of players such thatΓ (N)has a pure equilibrium. Let a, b ∈ N , and consider three additional players x, y, z /∈
N with neighborhoods and payoffs according to Fig. 4. Then, Γ (N ∪ {x, y, z}) has a pure equilibrium, and for every pure
equilibrium s ofΓ (N∪{x, y, z}), sx = 0 if sa = sb = 1, and sx = 1 otherwise. It is easily verified that players x, y, and z get
themaximum payoff of 1, and thus will not deviate, under any action profile swhere sx = sy = sz = 1 and #(s{a,b},1) ≤ 1
or where sx = sy = sz = 0 and sa = sb = 1. On the other hand, let s be an arbitrary action profile of Γ (N ∪ {x, y, z}). By
Property 1, s cannot be an equilibrium unless sx = sy = sz . If sa = sb = sz = 0 or sa = sb = sz = 1, then player z can
change his action to receive a higher payoff. If otherwise sa ≠ sz and sx = sy = 0, then there exists i ∈ {x, y} such that
#(1, sνˆ(i)) = 0, and player iwill deviate.
6. Let N be a set of players, o ∈ N . Let N ′ = {a, b, c} with neighborhoods as in Property 4, N ′′ = {d, e} with ν(d) = {a, e}
and ν(e) = {x, d}. Then, Γ (N ∪ N ′ ∪ N ′′) has a pure equilibrium if and only if Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium swith sx = 1.
Clearly, an action profile that is not an equilibrium of Γ (N) cannot be extended to an equilibrium of Γ (N ∪ N ′ ∪ N ′′).
On the other hand, assume that s is an equilibrium of Γ (N ∪ N ′ ∪ N ′′). Then, by Property 4, sa = 1. Furthermore, by
Property 1, sa = sx, and thus sx = 1.
Now consider an instance C of CSAT, and assume without loss of generality that C consists exclusively of NAND gates.
Since ϕ NAND true = ¬ϕ, and using Property 4, we can further assume that no variable appears more than once as an
input to the same gate. We construct a game Γ = Γ (N) as follows: For every input of C, we add three players according to
Property 2. For every gate of C with inputs corresponding to players a, b ∈ N , we add three players according to Property 5.
Finally, we add five players according to Property 6, where x is the player corresponding to the output of C. It is now readily
appreciated that Γ has a pure equilibrium if and only if C is satisfiable. 
3.3. Self-symmetry and two different payoffs
Let us return to self-symmetric graphical games. Self-symmetric games as studied by Brandt et al. [8] always possess a
pure Nash equilibrium due to the fact that they are common-payoff games. This is not the case for self-symmetric graphical
games, even when there are only two different payoffs. In particular, there exists a seven-player game in the latter class that
does not have a pure equilibrium, and inwhich each player has exactly two actions and twoneighbors. Itwill be instructive to
view a graphical game as a hypergraph, with each vertex corresponding to a player and each edge to the set of players in the
neighborhood of one particular player including the player himself. Corresponding to the set of gameswithm-neighborhood
is the set of (m + 1)-uniform hypergraphs that possess a matching in the sense of Seymour [17], i.e., a bijection from the
set of vertices to the set of edges that maps every vertex to an edge containing it. Then, a self-symmetric game with two
actions and payoffs pi = (0, 1, 1, 0) for all i ∈ N has a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if the corresponding hypergraph is
vertex two-colorable. Given a two-coloring, every player observes either one or two players in his neighborhood, including
himself, who play action 1, and thus obtains the maximum payoff of 1. If on the other hand there is no two-coloring, then
there is at least one player for every action profile who plays the same action as all of his neighbors and can deviate to obtain
a higher payoff. Fig. 5 shows the neighborhood of a graphical game with seven players and two neighbors for each player.
This graph induces the 3-uniform square hypergraph corresponding to the lines of the Fano plane, which in turn cannot be
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Fig. 5. Neighborhood graph of a graphical game with seven players (left), corresponding to the three-uniform square hypergraph given by the lines of the
Fano plane (right). A directed edge from vertex i to vertex j of the neighborhood graph denotes that j ∈ ν(i).
two-colored (see, e.g., [17]). We leave it to the avid reader to verify that there is no game with the above properties and less
than seven players.
An interesting property of the neighborhood graph on the left of Fig. 5 is that it does not have any cycles of even length.
We will begin our investigation of the pure equilibrium problem in self-symmetric games by generalizing this observation
to games with arbitrary neighborhoods and pi = (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) for all i ∈ N . The following lemma characterizes games
with pure equilibria in the above subclass in terms of cycles in the neighborhood graph. Seymour [17] provides a similar
characterization of the minimal uniform square hypergraphs that do not have a two-coloring.
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a self-symmetric graphical game with two actions per player and payoffs pi such that for all i ∈ N,
pi = (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0). Then, Γ has a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ N, there exists j ∈ N reachable from i
such that j lies on a cycle of even length.
Proof. For the implication from left to right, assume that there exists a pure equilibrium, i.e., a two-coloring c : N → {0, 1}
of the neighborhood graph such that for every i ∈ N , there exist j, j′ ∈ νˆ(i) with c(j) = 0 and c(j′) = 1. Now consider an
arbitrary player v1 ∈ N . Using the above property of c , we can construct a path v1, v2, . . . , v|N|+1, vi ∈ N , such that for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ |N|, c(vi) = 1 − c(vi+1). By the pigeonhole principle, there must exist i, j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |N| + 1, such that vi = vj
and for all j′, i < j′ < j, vj′ ≠ vi. Then, vi, vi+1, . . . , vj is a cycle of even length reachable from v1.
For the implication from right to left, let N ′ ⊆ N be a set of players such that for every i ∈ N there exists a directed
path to some j ∈ N ′, and such that N ′ induces a set of vertex-disjoint cycles of even length. We construct a two-coloring
c : N → {0, 1}, corresponding to an assignment of actions to players, as follows. First color the members of N ′ such that
for all i ∈ N ′ and j ∈ ν(i) ∩ N ′, c(i) = 1 − c(j). While there are uncolored vertices left, find i, j ∈ N such that j ∈ ν(i), i is
uncolored, and j is colored. Such a pair of vertices must always exist, since for every member of N there is a directed path
to some member of N ′, and thus to a vertex that has already been colored. Color i such that c(i) = 1− c(j). It is now easily
verified that at any given time, and for all i ∈ N that have already been colored, there exist j, j′ ∈ νˆ(i) with c(j) = 0 and
c(j′) = 1. If all vertices have been colored, then every neighborhood will contain at least one player playing action 0, and at
least one player playing action 1. The corresponding action profile is a pure Nash equilibrium. 
Thomassen [18] has shown that for every k, there exists a directed graph without even cycles where every vertex has
outdegree k. Together with Lemma 1, this means that the pure equilibrium problem for the considered class of games is
nontrivial.
Corollary 1. For every m ∈ N, m > 0, there exist self-symmetric graphical games Γ and Γ ′ with two actions where for all i ∈ N,
|ν(i)| = m and pi = (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0), such that Γ has a pure Nash equilibrium and Γ ′ does not.
We are now ready to identify several classes of graphical gameswhere the existence of a pure equilibrium can be decided
in polynomial time.
Theorem 4. Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N) be a self-symmetric graphical game with two actions and two different payoffs. Then,
the pure equilibrium problem for Γ can be decided in polynomial time if one of the following properties holds:
(i) for all i ∈ N, pi(0) ≥ pi(1) or for all i ∈ N, pi(|νˆ(i)|) ≥ pi(|νˆ(i)| − 1);
(ii) for all i ∈ N and all m, 1 ≤ m ≤ |ν(i)|, pi(m − 1) > pi(m) and pi(m + 1) > pi(m), or pi(m − 1) < pi(m) and
pi(m+ 1) < pi(m);
(iii) for all i ∈ N and all m, 1 ≤ m < |ν(i)|, pi(m) = pi(m+ 1).
Proof. It is easy to see that a game Γ satisfying (i) possesses a pure equilibrium s in which #(0, s) = 0 or #(1, s) = 0.
For a game Γ satisfying (ii), we observe that in every equilibrium s, pi(s) = 1 for all i ∈ N . The pure equilibrium problem
forΓ thus corresponds to a variant of generalized satisfiability, with clauses induced by neighborhoods ofΓ . The constraints
associatedwith this particular variant require that the number of variables in each clause set to true is odd, and canbewritten
as a system of linear equations overGF(2). Tractability of the pure equilibriumproblem forΓ then follows from Theorem2.1
of Schaefer [19].
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Fig. 6. Neighborhood graph and payoffs of a graphical game with eight players and neighborhoods of size four used in the proof of Theorem 5. The
neighborhood graph satisfies rotational symmetry and the neighborhood of player 1 is highlighted.
Finally, a game satisfying (iii) but not (i) can be transformed into a best response equivalent one that satisfies the
conditions of Lemma 1. We further claim that we can check in polynomial time whether for every i ∈ N , there exists j ∈ N
on a cycle of even length and reachable from i. For a particular i ∈ N , this problem is equivalent to checking whether the
subgraph induced by the vertices reachable from i contains an even cycle. The latter problem has long been open, but was
recently shown to be solvable in polynomial time [20]. 
It turns out that Theorem 4 specifically applies to every self-symmetric graphical game with two different payoffs and
neighborhoods of size at most three. We thus have the following.
Corollary 2. The problem of deciding whether a self-symmetric graphical game with two different payoffs and three-bounded
neighborhood has a pure equilibrium is in P.
Proof. Consider a game Γ as in the statement of the corollary, and assume without loss of generality that the two payoffs
of Γ are 0 and 1. Since Γ has neighborhoods of size at most three, the payoff of player i can be described by a function
pi : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, pi : {0, 1, 2} → {0, 1}, or pi : {0, 1, 2, 3} → {0, 1}. This function must actually be the same for all
players becauseΓ is self-symmetric. It is now easy, if somewhat tedious, to verify that each of the possible functions satisfies
one of the conditions of Theorem4. In fact, two of the functions, namely thosewherepi = (0, 1, 0) orpi = (0, 1, 1, 0), satisfy
condition (iii), while all others satisfy condition (i). 
3.4. Self-symmetry and larger neighborhoods
The question that remains is whether the pure equilibrium problem can be solved in polynomial time for all self-
symmetric graphical gameswith two payoffs, or whether there is some bound on the neighborhood sizewhere this problem
again becomes hard.Wewill show in this section that the latter is true, and that the correct bound is indeed four, as suggested
by Corollary 2.
Wewill essentially use the same tools as in Section 3.2, butwill extract the necessary complexity fromonly a single payoff
function. The additional insight required for this extraction will be that ‘‘constant’’ players, i.e., players who play the same
action in every pure equilibrium of a game, can be used to prune a larger payoff table and effectively obtain different payoff
functions for smaller neighborhoods that can then be used to proceedwith the original proof. Constructing such players will
prove a rather difficult task in its own right.
Theorem 5. Deciding whether a self-symmetric graphical game with two actions and two different payoffs has a pure Nash
equilibrium is NP-complete, even if every player has exactly four neighbors.
Proof. Membership inNP is obvious.We can simply guess an action for eachplayer and then verify that noplayer can increase
his payoff by playing a different action instead.
For hardness, we again give a reduction from CSAT to the problem at hand. The central idea of this proof will be to
guarantee that some players in a neighborhood only play certain well-defined actions in equilibrium. By this, the original
payoff table is effectively ‘‘pruned’’ to a smaller one that can then be used, like in earlier proofs, to model the behavior of
gates in a Boolean circuit.
As a first step, wewill show how to construct ‘‘constants,’’ i.e., players who play action 0 or action 1, respectively, in every
equilibrium of a game. To achieve this, we will construct a set of four players, such that in every equilibrium two of these
players play action 0 and two of them play action 1. A player observing these four players can determine if the number of
players in his neighborhood, including himself, who play action 1 is two or three. Clearly, such a player will play action 1 in
every equilibrium. By a similar argument, a player who observes four players who play action 1 in every equilibrium will
himself play action 0 in every equilibrium.
Consider the graphical game Γ with eight players and neighborhood of size four given in Fig. 6. We will argue that in
every pure equilibrium of this game, exactly two players i, j ∈ N play action 0 and i − j = 2 (mod 8). We exploit the
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following properties of the neighborhood graph:
1. For any N ′ ⊆ N , |N ′| = 3, there exists a player i ∈ N such that N ′ ⊆ νˆ(i). Due to the rotational symmetry of the
neighborhood graph, we can assume without loss of generality that 1 ∈ N ′. The property then follows by a
straightforward if somewhat tedious case analysis.
2. For any N ′ ⊆ N , |N ′| = 3, there exists a player i ∈ N such that |N ′ ∩ νˆ(i)| = 2. Showing this property is again
straightforward by assuming without loss of generality that 1 ∈ N ′ and showing that for any pair of distinct players,
there exists a player i ∈ N such that either νˆ(i) contains player 1 and exactly one element of the pair, or both elements
of the pair but not player 1.
3. For any N ′ ⊆ N , |N ′| = 4, there exists a player i ∈ N such that |N ′ ∩ νˆ(i)| = 3. To show this property, we can again
assume without loss of generality that 1 ∈ N ′, and distinguish neighborhoods that contain player 1 from neighborhoods
that do not. The analysis is again straightforward.
Now consider an equilibrium s of Γ , and observe that, due to the structure of the payoffs, it must be the case that
pi(s) = 1 for all i ∈ N . If #(0, s) < 2 or #(1, s) < 2, then there exists a player i ∈ N such that #(0, sνˆ(i)) = 0 or
#(1, sνˆ(i)) = 0. If #(0, s) = 2, assume without loss of generality that s1 = 0, and further assume for contradiction that there
exists i ∈ N \ {1, 3, 7} such that si = 0. Inspection of the neighborhood graph reveals that in this case there exists a player
j ∈ N such that #(0, sν(j)) = 0. If #(0, s) = 3, then by Property 1 there must exist a player i ∈ N such that #(0, sνˆ(i)) = 3
and thus #(1, sνˆ(i)) = 2, contradicting the assumption that s is an equilibrium. By Property 3, the same holds if #(0, s) = 4.
If #(0, s) = 5 and thus #(1, s) = 3, then by Property 2 there must yet again exist a player i ∈ N such that #(1, s) = 2, a
contradiction. The same trivially holds if #(1, s) = 2.
Now we augment Γ by a set {9, 10, . . . , 13} of five additional players such that
ν(i) =

{1, 3, 5, 7} if i ∈ {9, 10}
{2, 4, 6, 8} if i ∈ {11, 12}
{9, 10, 11, 12} if i = 13.
By construction of the original gamewith eight players, every pure equilibriumhas either two or four players in the common
neighborhood of players 9 and 10 play action 1. Furthermore, if players 9 and 10 observe two players who play action 1,
then players 11 and 12 will observe four players who play action 1, and vice versa. As a consequence, either players 9 and 10
will play action 0, and players 11 and 12 will play action 1, or the other way round. In any case, exactly two players in
the neighborhood of player 13 will play action 1 in every equilibrium of the augmented game, and player 13 himself will
therefore play action 1.
In the following, wewill denote by 01, 02, 03 ∈ N three players who play action 0 in every equilibrium, and by 11, 12 ∈ N
two players that constantly play action 1. Using these players to prune the payoff table, wewill proceed to design games that
simulate Boolean circuits. These games will satisfy self-symmetry, and the payoff of all players will therefore be determined
by the table already used above and shown in Fig. 6. As for the inputs of the circuit, it is easily verified that a game with
players N , |N| = 5, such that for all i ∈ N , νˆ(i) = N , has pure equilibria s and s′ such that for an arbitrary i ∈ N , si = 0 and
s′i = 1.
As before, we will now construct a subgame that simulates a functionally complete Boolean gate, in this case NOR, and a
subgame that has a pure equilibrium if and only if a particular player plays action 1. For a setN of players with appropriately
defined neighborhoods ν, let Γ (N) = (N, {0, 1}N , (pi)i∈N) be a graphical game with payoff functions pi satisfying self-
symmetry as in Fig. 6. We observe the following properties:
1. Let N and N ′ be two disjoint sets of players with neighborhoods such that for all i ∈ N , ν(i) ⊆ N , and for all i ∈ N ′,
ν(i) ⊆ N ′. Again, s is a pure equilibrium of Γ (N ∪ N ′) if and only if sN and sN ′ are pure equilibria of Γ (N) and Γ (N ′),
respectively.
2. Let N be a set of players such that Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium, let a, b ∈ N , and consider two additional players x, y /∈ N
with ν(x) = {01, 02, a, y}, and ν(y) = {01, 02, b, x}. Then every pure equilibrium of Γ (N ∪ {x, y}) satisfies sa = sb.
3. Letting b = 11 in the previous construction, we have that Γ (N ∪ {x, y}) has a pure equilibrium if and only if sa = 1 in
some pure equilibrium of Γ .
4. Let N be a set of players such that Γ (N) has a pure equilibrium, let a, b ∈ N , and consider two additional players x, y /∈ N
with neighborhoods given by ν(x) = {01, 02, 03, y} and ν(y) = {01, 02, a, b}. Then Γ (N ∪ {x, y}) has a pure equilibrium,
and every pure equilibrium s of Γ (N ∪ {x, y}) satisfies sx = 1 whenever sa = sb = 0, and sx = 0 whenever sa ≠ sb. For
every pure equilibrium swith sa = sb = 1, there exists a pure equilibrium s′ such that sx ≠ s′x, and si = s′i for all i ∈ N .
5. Consider an additional player z /∈ N ∪ {x, y}, and let ν(z) = {11, 12, a, b}. Then Γ (N ∪ {x, y, z}) has a pure equilibrium,
and every pure equilibrium s ofΓ (N∪{x, y, z}) satisfies sz = 1whenever sa = sb = 0, and sz = 0whenever sa = sb = 1.
For every pure equilibrium swith sa ≠ sb, there exists a pure equilibrium s′ such that sz ≠ s′z , and si = s′i for all i ∈ N .
6. By Property 2, we can assume that every equilibrium s of Γ (N ∪ {x, y, z}) satisfies sx = sz , and thus that sx = 1 if and
only if sa = sb = 0.
Steps 4 through 6 are illustrated in Fig. 7.
Now consider an instance C of CSAT, and assume without loss of generality that C consist exclusively of NOR gates
and that no variable appears more than once as an input to the same gate. The latter assumption can be made since
684 F. Brandt et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 675–685
Fig. 7. NOR gadget. Payoffs are identical to those in Fig. 6. A construction analogous to the one shown in Fig. 3 is used to ensure that players x and z play
the same action in every pure equilibrium.
ϕ NOR false = ¬ϕ, and since there exists a self-symmetric game and a player in this game who plays action 0 in every
pure equilibrium. As before, we construct a game Γ by simulating every gate of C according to Property 6 and identifying
the player that corresponds to the output of the circuit with a in Property 3. It is now readily appreciated that Γ has a pure
equilibrium if and only if C is satisfiable. 
Observing that in the constructions used in the proofs of Theorems 2, 3 and 5 there is a one-to-one correspondence
between satisfying assignments of a Boolean circuit and pure equilibria of a game, we have that counting the number of
pure equilibria in the respective games is as hard as computing the permanent of a matrix.
Corollary 3. For graphical games with neighborhoods of size two, counting the number of pure Nash equilibria is #P-hard, even
when restricted to symmetric games with two different payoffs, to self-anonymous games with two different payoffs and two
different payoff functions, or to self-symmetric games with three different payoffs. The same holds for self-symmetric graphical
games with neighborhoods of size four and two different payoffs.
4. Interlude: generalized satisfiability in the presence of a matching
The analysis at the end of the previous section allows us to derive a corollary that may be of independent interest.
Schaefer [19] completely characterizes which variants of the generalized satisfiability problem are in P and which are
NP-complete. Some of the variants become tractable if there exists a matching, i.e., a bijection from variables to clauses
that maps every variable to a clause it appears in. For not-all-equal 3SAT, for example, this follows from equivalence with
two-colorability of three-uniform hypergraphs and from the work of Robertson et al. [20]. On the other hand, the proof
of Theorem 5 identifies a variant that is NP-complete and remains so in the presence of a matching. We thus obtain the
following result, a complete characterization is left for future work.
Corollary 4. Generalized satisfiability is NP-complete, even if there exists a matching and all clauses have size five.
Proof. Given a gameΓ as constructed in the proof of Theorem 5, define a satisfiability problemwith variablesN and clauses
C = { (i, νˆ(i)) : i ∈ N }, where N is the set of players of Γ and νˆ(i) is the set containing the neighbors of a player i ∈ N and i
itself. Call an instance of this problem satisfiable if there exists an assignment that sets 1, 3, or 4 variables of each clause to 1,
i.e., a function v : N → {0, 1} such that for each (i, c) ∈ C , |{ j ∈ c : v(j) = 1 }.
It is now easy to see that a particular instance is satisfiable if and only if the corresponding game has a pure Nash
equilibrium, which together with the proof of Theorem 5 implies that deciding the former is NP-hard. It is furthermore
obvious from the definition of C that the satisfiability problem has amatching, i.e., a bijection between variables and clauses,
and that each clause has size five. 
5. Mixed equilibria
Let us now briefly look at the problem of finding a mixed equilibrium. The following theorem states that this problem is
tractable in symmetric graphical games if the number of actions grows slowly in the neighborhood size. The proof relies on
the fact that such games always have a symmetric equilibrium.
Theorem 6. LetΓ = (N, AN , (pi)i∈N) be a symmetric graphical gamewith neighborhoods of size k and |A| = O(log k/ log log k).
Then, a Nash equilibrium of Γ can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We show that Γ possesses a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., one where all players play the same (mixed) strategy,
and that this equilibrium can be computed efficiently. For this, choose an arbitrary player i ∈ N and construct a game
Γi = (Ni, ANi , (pi,j)j∈N)with playersNi = νˆ(i), and for all j ∈ Ni, pi,j(s′) = pi(s) if s′j = si and for all a ∈ A, #(a, s′) = #(a, sν(i)).
Now, since Γ is a symmetric graphical game, it is easily verified that Γi is a symmetric game, and must therefore possess
a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., one where all the players in Ni play the same strategy. By a result of Papadimitriou and
Roughgarden [9], one such equilibrium s′ can be computed in polynomial time if |A| = O(log |Ni|/ log log |Ni|). This is the
case because |Ni| = k and |A| = O(log |k|/ log log |k|). Moreover, due to the symmetry of Γ , all the games Γi for i ∈ N are
isomorphic, and thus s′ is an equilibrium in each of them.
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Now define a strategy profile s of Γ by letting, for each i ∈ N , si = s′1, and assume for contradiction that s is not an
equilibrium. Then there exists a player i ∈ N and some strategy t ∈ ∆(A) for this player such that pi(sN\{i}, t) > pi(s). Then,
by definition of pi,j, pi,i(s′Ni\{i}, t) > pi,i(s), contradicting the assumption that s
′ is an equilibrium of Γi. 
This result applies in particular to the case where both the number of actions and the neighborhood size are bounded.
Since the pure equilibrium problem in symmetric graphical games is NP-complete even in the case of two actions, we have
identified a class of games where computing a mixed equilibrium is computationally easier than deciding the existence of
a pure one, unless P = NP. A different class of games with the same property is implicit in Theorem 3.4 of Daskalakis and
Papadimitriou [11]. On the other hand, existence of a symmetric equilibrium does not in general extend to games that are
not anonymous or in which players have different payoff functions.
6. Open problems
In this paperwe havemainly considered neighborhoods of constant size. The construction used in the proof of Theorem 5
can be generalized to arbitrary neighborhoods of even size, but it is unclear what happens for odd-sized neighborhoods. The
extreme case when the neighborhood of every player consists of all other players yields ordinary symmetric games, and
it is known that the pure equilibrium problem in these games is in P when the number of actions is bounded [8]. It is
an open problem at which neighborhood size the transition between membership in P and NP-hardness occurs. Another
open question concerns the complexity of the mixed equilibrium problem in anonymous graphical games. A promising
direction for proving hardness would be tomake the construction of Goldberg and Papadimitriou [2] anonymous. Finally, as
suggested in Section 4, it would be interesting to study the complexity of generalized satisfiability problems in the presence
of matchings.
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